Process or Outcome?

Today I was reading a LinkedIn post lamenting the state of health and safety management, evidenced by too many “safety stickers” on a piece of machinery.

A commenter noted that the situation was “absolute madness“, which doesn’t keep anyone safe. Much of the conversation from there was focused on whose “fault” it was and we ended up with all of the usual suspects in the firing line – insurers, lawyers, consultants and so on. Probably quite justified too.

To my mind, this issue illustrates the disconnect apparent in health and safety management between “process” and “outcome“. It seems to me that health and safety management is obsessed with process – the way that we “do” safety. This obsession means that every few years somebody reinvents the way we do safety, or the way we do parts of safety. As evidence of this you only need to think of the transition from safety culture, to safety 1, through to safety 2 and now safety differently – with god only knows what in between. On a micro level, just think how many iterations of the JHA you have seen during your working career.

What makes this more interesting is the process doesn’t really matter. How you “do” safety is not really an issue. What is important is whether you can show your process achieves the outcome it was designed for.

The table below lists a series of cases looking at the “outcome” of understanding hazards. The “processes” were all different: documented, undocumented, buddy systems, on-the-job training and so on. But even where the processes were the same this did not determine the decision – the decision was determined on whether the outcome, and understanding of hazards and risks, was achieved.

Process v outcome

So, the question is not how fancy, new or shiny your process is. The question is whether it achieves the outcome.

Due Diligence Program in New Zealand

This is a call out to all of my connections in New Zealand.

Dr Rob Long and I will be in New Zealand at the end of August, running due diligence programs for clients. While we are in Auckland, we want to take the opportunity to run some 1-day, public due diligence programs, and are calling for expressions of interest for either 30 or 31 August.

During the program we will be discussing ideas from our book, Risk Conversations: The Law, Social Phycology and Risk. You can also see our discussion about due diligence from the book, in the video below.

The expected cost of the 1-day program is $495 (AUD) plus GST.

You can access more information about the program HERE. You can also email me directly- gws@nexuslawyers.com.au – or email admin@humandymensions.com.

 

 

What we say matters: Zero and other Aspirations

It seems hardly a day goes by without social media raising a new discussion about the merits or otherwise of “Zero Harm”.

As I understand the various arguments “for” and “against”, there seemed to be three broad categories of argument (although I do not discount further or additional arguments).

One argument says that Zero Harm is not a target, or a goal, rather it is an aspiration – something to pursue.  If I may be so bold as to paraphrase Prof Andrew Hopkins, it is like a state of grace – something to be striven for, but never truly achieved.

Another argument, more of a middle ground, articulates that Zero Harm is “okay”, but may have an unintended consequence of driving adverse behaviour.  In particular, it is argued that Zero Harm causes individuals and organisations to hide incidents or manipulate injury data in support of an organisation’s “zero” targets.

Yet another argument says that the language of zero is totally corrosive and destructive.  It argues  the language of zero  – amongst other things – primes a discourse that is anti-learning and anti-community (See, For the Love of Zero by Dr Robert Long).

I would like to use this article to discuss two matters.  First, the Safety Paradox in the context of aspirational statements, only using “zero” as a starting example.  Second, to demonstrate how aspirational statements can be used against organisations.  Both these points are closely related but ultimately, I want to argue whatever your “aspirations” you need to have “assurance” about the effect they have on your business.

The Safety Paradox is a concept I have been exploring for some time now.  The Safety Paradox supposes that our safety initiatives have within them the potential to improve safety and cause harm.

In my view, the single biggest weakness in modern safety management is the assumption that safety management initiatives are “good“.  I have no doubt that the proponents of Zero Harm suffer from this assumption.

The question of whether Zero Harm is good or bad is, on one view, totally irrelevant.  If you are a Zero Harm organisation the only thing that really matters is the impact Zero Harm has in your workplace.

  • What is the purpose of Zero Harm in your organisation?
  • How do you demonstrate that Zero Harm achieves this purpose?
  • How do you evidence that Zero Harm does not undermine safety in the way that many commentators suggest?

My personal experience with Zero Harm means that I remain unconvinced of its benefits, but I do not feel I am closed to being persuaded otherwise, it is just that I have never worked with an organisation that has been able to address the three questions proposed above.  Moreover, in my experience, there is usually a significant disconnect between corporate intentions and operational reality: What management think is going on is often very different from what the workforce believes.

Considering all the published criticism of Zero Harm as a concept, I do not think it is unfair that the onus should be on Zero Harm organisations – including government regulators – to demonstrate that Zero Harm achieves its intended purpose and does not have a negative impact on safety.

Now, this is more than a matter of semantics.  Aspirational statements can, and are used against individuals and organisations.

On 21 August 2009 and uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons occurred on the West Atlas drilling rig operating off the North-West coast of Australia.  The incident reawakened the Australian Public to the dangers of offshore oil and gas production, leading to a Commission of Inquiry into the event.

During the Commission the aspirational statements of one organisation was used against an individual.  The criticism was that a contractor had removed a piece of safety critical hardware, but not replaced it, and had not been directed by the relevant individual to replace it.

There was some discussion about a presentation provided by the organisation, and that resulted in the following exchange.

Montara slide

Q: All right. If the operator could go to page 0004 of this document, that overhead, which is part of the induction training of drilling supervisors, is entitled “Standards”. Do you see that?

A: Yes.

Q: If you could read what is said there, you would agree it captures, if you like, a profound truth?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you agree that that is a truth not simply applicable to drilling supervisors but also applicable to PTT management onshore?

A: Yes.

Q: I want to suggest to you, sir, that your decision not to instruct Mr O’Shea or Mr Wishart to reinstall the 9-5/8″ PCC represents a very significant departure from what is described on that screen.

A: Yes, I can concede that.

Q: Without wishing to labour the point, your decision not to insist upon the reinstallation of the 9-5/8″ PCC was a failure in both leadership and management on your part?

A: Yes, that’s what it seems now.

Q: With respect, sir, I’m suggesting to you that, faced with the circumstances you were, your deference, as it were, to not treading on the toes of the rig personnel and insisting on the reinstallation was, at that point in time, a failure in leadership and management on your part.

A: I will accept that.

How many of these untested platitudes infect organisations, waiting for the opportunity to expose the business to ridicule and criticism?

Or consider if you will, the following scenario. An employee is dismissed for breaching mobile phone requirements when his mobile phone was found in the cabin of the truck he had been operating.

The employee bought an unfair dismissal claim and the presiding tribunal found that there was a valid reason to terminate his employment.  However, the tribunal also found that the termination was unfair for several procedural reasons. In part, the tribunal relied on the level of training and information that the employee had been provided about the relevant procedure.

The training documentation provided did not clearly demonstrate that employees were trained in this new procedure and signed accordingly, or that it was given a significant roll-out to employees commensurate with their ‘zero tolerance’ attitude to incidents of breaches, given how this case has been pursued (my emphasis added).

If you are going to have a “Zero” aspiration, that has to be reflected in your business practices. It seldom is.

What I think these examples illustrate is an inherent weakness in the way health and safety is managed.  We, as an industry, are overwhelmingly concerned with “how” we manage health and safety risks without paying anything like enough attention to whether the “how” works.

Do all of our aspirations and activities actually manage health and safety risks, or are we just keep keeping people busy or worse, wasting their time?  As importantly, how do we know our initiatives are not part of the problem?

BP’s corporate management mandated numerous initiatives that applied to the U.S. refineries and that, while well-intentioned, have Baker panel reviewoverloaded personnel at BP’s U.S. refineries. This “initiative overload” may have undermined process safety performance at the U.S. refineries (The Report of the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel (Baker Panel Review), page xii).

There is no doubt that safety is not the only management discipline that suffers from these deficiencies: “style over substance” and “window dressing”.  But if we claim the high moral ground of protecting human health and life, then perhaps the onus on us to show what we do works, is also higher.

Health & Safety Assurance Workshop

On 2 May 2017, I am running a HSE assurance workshop in conjunction with Roy Fitzgerald from Meta-Dymensions.

The program will teach participants the key legal principles for demonstrating effective HSE assurance and how to develop a methodology for demonstrating and evidencing that HSE hazards and risks are being managed as low as reasonably practicable.

As part of the workshop, participants need to bring information about a HSE hazard in their workplace and during the workshop will apply the assurance methodology to:

·    Build an assurance process for that hazard; and

·    Create a framework to demonstrate and evidence whether (or the extent to which) the hazard is managed as low as reasonably practicable.

Participants will be required to bring information about the hazard and how it is controlled, including policies, procedures, standards and so on. Ideally photographs, diagrams and maps if applicable.

The hazard that participants review should not be too complex.  It is more important that participants work through a hazard to ensure they understand and can apply the methodology.  Once they have the understanding, they will be able to apply it to more complex hazards.

Spaces in the workshop are limited, and we do not anticipate more than 20 participants for this program.  However, to participate, you must send at least two or three participants so they can discuss and work together on reviewing the hazard and developing the assurance processes.  You can only send a maximum of three participants.

You can find more information about the workshop, including venues and prices HERE, but please give contact me a call if you have any questions would like to discuss the workshop.

 

Safety leadership: enabler, excuse or doing harm?

I do not think that there is any serious view suggesting that “leadership” is not an important, if not the most important driver of safety performance.  One of the main findings from a 2002 review of Safety Culture was:

…  management was the key influence of an organisation’s safety culture. A review of the safety climate literature revealed that employees’ perceptions of management’s attitudes and behaviours towards safety, production and issues such as planning, discipline etc. was the most useful measurement of an organisation’s safety climate. The research indicated that different levels of management may influence health and safety in different ways, for example managers through communication and supervisors by how fairly they interact with workers (Thompson, 1998). Thus, the key area for any intervention of an organisation’s health and safety policy should be management’s commitment and actions towards safety (Safety Culture: A review of the literature).

In the wake of findings like these, and numerous others, it is unsurprising that safety leadership often dominates discussions about safety management.

But are there conversations about safety leadership that we are not having and should be?

To my mind, the hard work in health and safety management is understanding if, or the extent to which, health and safety risks in our business are being controlled.  All too often, however, in my experience “leadership” is an excuse to avoid the hard work of health and safety management.

The “psychology” (and I use that term as a complete layperson) of safety leadership seems to be that if I can convince my workforce that I genuinely care for them and that safety is genuinely important, then safety will take care of itself.

If I “care“, if I am a “safety leader” I do not need to do the hard work to critically challenge incident investigations, I do not need to analyse, understand and challenge audits.  If I am a “safety leader” then I can accept declining personal injury rates and green traffic lights on my corporate scorecard as evidence that my safety management system is working, without ever having to challenge the assumptions that underpinned that information.  Assumptions that have been shown time and again to be wrong.

This is the same discourse that threaded its way through safety culture: It doesn’t matter how bad our management systems are because we have a good “culture“.   It is also the same discourse that is starting to creep into the next wave of safety thinking, concepts like “safety differently” and “appreciative enquiry“.

I make no comment on the efficacy of leadership, culture, safety differently, appreciative enquiry or whatever the next trend will be but I do question where, in any of these concepts, we do the hard work of confirming that our risks are being controlled.

I recall many years ago reviewing a matter where a worker sent a hazardous substance through the internal mail using a yellow into office envelope (back when they existed).  The worker broke every one of the organisations procedures and protocols for managing hazardous substances, yet the organisation viewed this dangerous  event as a triumph of their “culture“, because the worker “cared“.

The twisted logic where organisations use leadership or culture to wallpaper over the cracks of ineffective safety management systems, and actively avoid the hard work of understanding if their risks are being controlled,  is very often bought into stark relief following a disaster.

The next time you are in a meeting discussing safety management  listen to see if leadership or culture is being used as an avoidance strategy.  Are the difficult topics such as improving the quality of incident investigation or clarifying complex and bureaucratic safety management systems  or improving risk assessments bypassed with comments like:

we just need to get out and be seen more

or

we just need to spend more time in the field talking to the blokes

 Is this leadership or an excuse to avoid the hard work?

Over and above  avoiding what really needs to be done, is it possible that the things we do in the name of “leadership” have the potential to actively undermine safety in our organisations?

Whatever your “leadership” objective might be, whether it is to demonstrate commitment, to understand the work being performed in your organisation, to appreciate what might be preventing people from complying with safety procedures or any other objective, how do you know that your actions in the name of leadership are achieving those objectives?   Because for all your good intentions there is a real risk that your presence in the field talking about safety might have the opposite effect.  It might promote cynicism amongst your workforce, it might disengage them from your safety message.

You may be seen as a leader whose only concern is to cover their own backside and who obsesses over safety issues important to you, without really listening to the concerns of the workforce.

How do you know if your safety leadership works?

I think that much of what is done in the name of safety and health has, consciously or unconsciously, devolved into “window dressing“.   Much of what we do is held up to the public or to our workforce as evidence of our commitment to safety, yet the substantive hard work necessary to understand if our health and safety risks are being managed remains undone – the façade of health and safety management is attractive but the building is crumbling.

Safety leadership and related concepts of care and culture have a place.  More than that, they are critically important.  But they are not buzzwords to be lightly tossed around and as a critical process, leadership deserves the same level of scrutiny and analysis as any of your other critical processes.